‌沃勒斯坦最近发表在《每月评论》的文章对公行（朱云川）的温和批评

　　【简介】《每月评论》杂志是美国极具代表性的知名社会主义独立刊物。进入21世纪，《每月评论》坚持独立思考的学术原则，对资本主义新变化和社会主义新变革敏锐发掘、尖锐批判、激烈辩论、热烈畅想，形成对马克思主义理论尤其是对马克思主义政治学的突出贡献。

　　孟飞:　　

　　沃勒斯坦最近发表在每月评论的文章对公行你的中国超越美国的论点进行了温和的批评. 可曾注意吗?　　

　　孟飞:　　

　　费尔南德·布罗代尔中心

　　纽约州宾汉顿大学，美国　　

　　Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University　　

　　http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm

　　孟飞:　　

　　中国到2025年是否会成为世界第一？可以肯定的是，中国在经济上表现相当好，它正在积极扩大自己的军事力量，它甚至开始在远离本国边界的地区发挥重要的政治作用。2025年的中国无疑将比现在强大的多，但中国面临三个它必须解决的问题。　　

　　第一个是国内问题。中国在政治上尚未稳定。一党制结构得到经济成功力量和民族感情的支持。但它面临大约一半人口由于被甩在后面而产生的不满，也面临另一半人口由于其国内政治自由受到限制而产生的不满。　　

　　中国的第二个问题与世界经济有关。中国（与印度）消费的极大扩张将让世界生态和资本积累可能性双双付出代价。过多的消费者和过多的生产者将对世界范围的利润水平产生严重后果。　　

　　第三个问题涉及中国的邻国。假如中国统一了台湾，协助朝鲜半岛实现统一，并与日本（在心理和政治上）实现和解，那么，有可能出现一个能够获得霸权地位的统一的东亚地缘政治结构。　

　　这三个问题都能得到解决，但将是不容易的。中国到2025年能否克服这些困难是不确定的。

　　公行:　　

　　哇，看不懂外文，有没有中文版的内容　　

　　孟飞:　　

　　这是译文的一部分.和你的观点有关的.　　

　　你的论调能够受到沃勒斯坦这样世界级的大学者关注,就算是他反对你,你也值得骄傲了.呵呵.　

　　公行:　　

　　哦，我不清楚

　　不过，我看过以上的观点，不太认同，他不太了解中国　　

　　孟飞:　　

　　沃勒斯坦,世界体系论的创始人,美国左翼杂志<每月评论>的领导者.世界著名学者.　　

　　沃勒斯坦本人是年鉴学派创始人布罗代尔的学生.

　　是当之无愧的大历史学家.　　

　　公行:　　

　　哦，每月评论的左翼，与中国所说的左翼，大致相当吗　　

　　------------------------------

　　附原文： http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm　　

　　Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University　　

　　List of previous commentaries in English and translations in other languages　　

　　Commentary No. 186, June 1, 2006　　

　　"Whose Century is the 21st Century?"　　

　　In 1941, Henry Luce proclaimed the twentieth century the American century. And most analysts have agreed with him ever since. Of course, the twentieth century was more than merely the American century. It was the century of the decolonization of Asia and Africa. It was the century of the flourishing of both fascism and communism as political movements. And it was the century of both the Great Depression and the incredible, unprecedented expansion of the world-economy in the 25 years after the end of the Second World War.　

　　But nonetheless, it was the American century. The United States became the unquestioned hegemonic power in the period 1945-1970 and shaped a world-system to its liking. The United States became the premier economic producer, the dominant political force, and the cultural center of the world-system. The United States, in short, ran the show, at least for a while.　　

　　Now, the United States is in visible decline. More and more analysts are willing to say this openly, even if the official line of the U.S. establishment is to deny this vigorously, just as a certain portion of the world left insists on the continued hegemony of the United States. But clear-minded realists on all sides recognize that the U.S. star is growing dimmer. The question that underlies all serious prognostication is then, whose century is the twenty-first century?　　

　　Of course, it is only 2006, and a bit early to answer this question with any sense of certainty. But nonetheless, political leaders everywhere are making bets on the answer and shaping their policies accordingly. If we rephrase the question to ask merely what may the world look like in, for example, 2025, we may at least be able to say something intelligent.　

　　There are basically three sets of answers to the question of what the world will look like in 2025. The first is that the United States will enjoy one last fling, a revival of power, and will continue to rule the roost in the absence of any serious military contender. The second is that China will displace the United States as the world's superpower. The third is that the world will become an arena of anarchic and relatively unpredictable multi-polar disorder. Let us examine the plausibility of each of these three predictions.　　

　　The United States on top? There are three reasons to doubt this. The first, an economic reason, is the fragility of the U.S. dollar as the sole reserve currency in the world-economy. The dollar is sustained now by massive infusions of bond purchases by Japan, China, Korea, and other countries. It is highly unlikely that this will continue. When the dollar falls dramatically, it may momentarily increase the sale of manufactured goods, but the United States will lose its command on world wealth and its ability to expand the deficit without serious immediate penalty. The standard of living will fall and there will be an influx of new reserve currencies, including the euro and the yen.　　

　　The second reason is military. Both Afghanistan and especially Iraq have demonstrated in the last few years that it is not enough to have airplanes, ships, and bombs. A nation must also have a very large land force to overcome local resistance. The United States does not have such a force, and will not have one, due to internal political reasons. Hence, it is doomed to lose such wars.　　

　　The third reason is political. Nations throughout the world are drawing the logical conclusion that they can now defy the United States politically. Take the latest instance: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which brings together Russia, China, and four Central Asian republics, is about to expand to include India, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Iran. Iran has been invited at the very moment that the United States is trying to organize a worldwide campaign against the regime. The Boston Globe has called this correctly "an anti-Bush alliance" and a "tectonic shift in geopolitics."　　

　　Will China then emerge on top by 2025? To be sure, China is doing quite well economically, is expanding its military force considerably, and is even beginning to play a serious political role in regions far from its borders. China will undoubtedly be much stronger in 2025; however, China faces three problems that it must overcome.　　

　　The first problem is internal. China is not politically stabilized. The one-party structure has the force of economic success and nationalist sentiment in its favor. But it faces the discontent of about half of the population that has been left behind, and the discontent of the other half about the limits on their internal political freedom.　　

　　China's second problem concerns the world-economy. The incredible expansion of consumption in China (along with that of India) will take its toll both on the world's ecology and on the possibilities of capital accumulation. Too many consumers and too many producers will have severe repercussions on worldwide profit levels.　　

　　The third problem lies with China's neighbors. Were China to accomplish the reintegration of Taiwan, help arrange the reunification of the Koreas, and come to terms (psychologically and politically) with Japan, there might be an East Asian unified geopolitical structure that could assume a hegemonic position.　　

　　All three of these problems can be overcome, but it will not be easy. And the odds that China can overcome these difficulties by 2025 are uncertain.　　

　　The last scenario is that of multi-polar anarchy and wild economic fluctuations. Given the inability of maintaining an old hegemonic power, the difficulty of establishing a new one, and the crisis in worldwide capital accumulation, this third scenario appears the most likely.　　

　　by Immanuel Wallerstein　　

　　[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.　　

　　These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]　　

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